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I. INTRODUCTION
Americans are raised with the fundamental idea that they can live
their lives freely and enjoy inalienable rights such as “life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness.”1 But that is not always the case. Imagine
Lisa and Kathy, two women who have been in a happy relationship for
fifteen years, but who have been unable to symbolically consecrate
that healthy relationship in marriage. Then, imagine their elation
upon seeing news headlines on Friday, June 26, 2015, stating that
they at last could be legally married in all fifty states.2 As an expres-
sion of their newly recognized constitutional right,3 Lisa and Kathy
get married on Saturday, June 27, 2015.4 After celebrating Saturday
night and finally enjoying their time as a couple on Sunday, June 28,
2015, it is back to work on Monday.
Monday is when this happily married couple’s story abruptly
changes. When Kathy’s boss discovers that she had celebrated the
Obergefell outcome by getting married to Lisa over the weekend, the
boss fires Kathy. Her boss may have done so because of religious
views,5 political views, or general outrage for the case’s outcome. Until
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) see, e.g., Stephanie Condon, Supreme
Court: Marriage is a Fundamental Right for Gay Couples, CBS NEWS (June 27,
2015), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/supreme-court-marriage-is-a-fundamen-
tal-right-for-gay-couples/ [https://perma.unl.edu/UX3J-XALN]; Adam Liptak, Su-
preme Court Ruling Makes Same-Sex Marriage a Right Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES
(June 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/supreme-court-same-
sex-marriage.html?mcubz=0; Plaintiff in Same-Sex Marriage Case Expresses
Gratitude, FOX NEWS (June 26, 2015, 2:04 PM), http://video.foxnews.com/v/
4323930412001/?#sp=show-clips [https://perma.unl.edu/L8HP-PPSN]; Ariane de
Vogue & Jeremy Diamond, Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Same-Sex Marriage
Nationwide, CNN POLITICS (June 27, 2015, 11:04 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/
06/26/politics/supreme-court-same-sex-marriage-ruling/index.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/U8CF-6ETH].
3. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
4. Or perhaps the couple got married the same day as the Supreme Court decision.
See Polly Mosendz, Here are Some of the First Gay Couples Marry After Supreme
Court Decision, NEWSWEEK (June 26, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/meet-
first-gay-couples-who-got-married-after-scotus-decision-347618 [https://
perma.unl.edu/C68U-N989]; Guardian Staff, Same-Sex Marriage: Meet the First
12 Lovely Couples to Wed in Holdout States, GUARDIAN (June 27, 2015), https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/27/same-sex-marriage-first-couples-
marry-states [https://perma.unl.edu/6HAD-XLMH].
5. See Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, Guidance on Federal Law Pro-
tections for Religious Liberty (Oct. 6, 2017) (on file with NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW)
(stating that “[r]eligious corporations, associations, educational institutions, and
societies . . . have an express statutory exemption from Title VII’s prohibition on
religious discrimination in employment,” which allows companies to use religious
grounds to discriminate against employees whose beliefs do not align with the
company’s religious ideals).
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April 4, 2017, this practice was permitted nationwide under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act.6
However, the Seventh Circuit ruled otherwise in Hively v. Ivy Tech
Community College (Hively 2), which is the subject of this Note.7 This
Note evaluates whether employment discrimination based on sexual
orientation is protected under Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination
based on sex. Part II provides a background of the history, purpose,
and effect of Title VII. Part II also outlines the circuit split created by
Hively 2.8 Part III analyzes whether existing precedent in the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, or
alternatively the Seventh and Second Circuits’ departure from prece-
dent, is correct. Part III argues that by looking at the broad goals of
Title VII and the existing valid claims of discrimination based on gen-
der nonconformity and discrimination based on racial association, the
Seventh Circuit correctly decided Hively 2. Part III also notes that
while the overall outcome was correct, certain aspects of the majority’s
reasoning were flawed.
This Article proposes that the correct analysis uses interpretations
grounded in the established broad goals of Title VII and existing pre-
cedent allowing claims of gender nonconformity and associational
claims under Title VII. This approach ultimately fulfills Title VII’s
purpose of protecting employees who are otherwise exercising their
constitutional right to associate with whom they desire and “define
and express their identity” as they wish, but who face retaliation for
expressing those rights in the conditions of their employment or are
discharged from their employment.9 Part III also examines the policy
implications of overturning precedent, as the court in Hively 2 did.10
Part IV summarizes why this proposed standard offers the best pro-
tection for employees and conforms to the purpose of Title VII.
6. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. (Hively 2), 853 F.3d 339, 340 (7th Cir. 2017); Evans
v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017); Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC,
679 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2012); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285 (3d
Cir. 2009); Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2005); Hig-
gins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999); Fredette v.
BVP Mgmt. Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of
Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,
876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979).
7. Hively 2, 853 F.3d 339 (overruling the Seventh Circuit’s three judge panel deci-
sion in Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. (Hively 1), 830 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2016)).
8. Id.
9. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135
S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
10. Hively 2, 853 F.3d at 349–50; id. at 354–55, 357 (Posner, J., concurring).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Title VII
1. Creation and Effect of Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an
employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ-
ual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.”11 The purpose of Title VII is to protect employees and
create equality in the workplace, where there were significant dispari-
ties before, by prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin;12 and to create the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, an agency through which employees can seek res-
olution of discrimination issues.13 The Civil Rights Act critically
expanded employee rights and protection of certain groups of people
who were socially disadvantaged, as shown through the enumerated
categories, and continues to do so through the interpretive expansions
of those categories.
Prior to Congress’s implementation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
there were many disparities in the workforce generally, as well as
within the workplace. Before the enactment of Title VII, it was com-
mon to find job listings in newspapers that required applicants to
state their marital status, or listings separated into categories of jobs
for women and jobs for men.14 Disparities in employment opportuni-
ties were so egregious, especially in the context of race, that civil
rights groups held protests and riots across the nation, most notably
coming to a climax in the infamous Birmingham riots.15 These events
led President John F. Kennedy to make a statement on June 11, 1963,
in an address to the nation, stating:
We are confronted primarily with a moral issue. It is as old as the scriptures
and it is as clear as the American Constitution. The heart of the question is
whether all Americans are afforded equal rights and equal opportunities,
whether we are going to treat our fellow Americans as we want to be
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (2012).
14. See Tamara Lytle, Title VII Changed the Face of the American Workplace, SOC’Y
FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (May 21, 2014), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/
hr-magazine/pages/title-vii-changed-the-face-of-the-american-workplace.aspx
[https://perma.unl.edu/73W9-5FT6] (noting that “classified ads often spelled out
which genders and races could apply for particular jobs”); Ads from The State
Seeking “Male Help” and “Female Help,” June, 1958, TEACHING AM. HIST. S.C.,
http://teachingushistory.org/tTrove/wantads.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/TS53-
4U4M] (last updated 2009); Gender-Biased Job Opportunities Before WWII,
BROWN U. LIBR., http://cds.library.brown.edu/projects/WWII_Women/RA/NCraig/
Jobs.html [https://perma.unl.edu/6DHM-8SMG].
15. Pre 1965: Events Leading to the Creation of EEOC, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/history/35th/pre1965/index.html [https://perma.unl.edu/7RLT-K2A8].
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treated . . . . Now the time has come for this nation to fulfill its promise. The
events of Birmingham and elsewhere have so increased the cries for equality
that no city or state or legislative body can prudently ignore them.16
The changes that President Kennedy envisioned in his address were
finally realized on July 2, 1964, when Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.17
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an
employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ-
ual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.”18 Congress passed Title VII in light of egregious racism
in the employment context and the need for legislation that would
“close existing gaps” in employment law and protect African Ameri-
cans as well as other minority groups at risk of employment discrimi-
nation by employers.19 Two days before Title VII passed,
Representative Howard Smith proposed that the category of sex be
added.20 He stated that it should be included because it “[would] do
some good for the minority sex.”21 Despite this category being a last-
minute addition to the proposed bill,22 the amendment relating to sex
passed by a vote of 168 to 133 in the House of Representatives, which
sent the bill to the Senate, where it made amendments unrelated to
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
19. On June 19, 1963, President Kennedy sent a message to Congress expressing his
approval to “close existing gaps” created by the enactment of discrimination pro-
hibition in twenty-two states and the lack of any protection in all other states or
federally. Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L.
REV. 431, 432–33 (1966) (citing 109 CONG. REC. 3245, 11178 (1963)).
20. Representative Smith may have opposed passing the civil rights bill, but pro-
posed this amendment as a potential deterrent to others who would not want to
add sex as an enumerated category. ERIC S. DREIBAND & BRETT SWEARINGEN, THE
EVOLUTION OF TITLE VII—SEXUAL ORIENTATION, GENDER IDENTITY, AND THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 2 (2015) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964)), http://
www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/07f7db13-4b8c-44c3-a89b-6dcfe4a9e2a1/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/74a116bc-2cfe-42d2-92a5-787b40ee0567/
dreiband_lgbt.authcheckdam.pdf. Others believe that his proposal to add “sex”
may have been genuine, given his historical support for women’s equality. Zarda
v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 139 (2d Cir. 2018) (Lynch, J., dissenting)
(noting specifically that Representative Smith “had been a longstanding sup-
porter of a constitutional amendment guaranteeing equal rights to women”) (cit-
ing TODD S. PURDUM, AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME 196 (2014)).
21. DREIBAND & SWEARINGEN, supra note 20, at 2.
22. The proposal to add “sex” to the enumerated categories occurred only hours
before the vote took place in the House of Representatives. Cary Franklin, In-
venting the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307,
1317–19 (2012). As a result, the interpretation of Title VII’s prohibition of dis-
crimination “because of sex” has been somewhat inconsistent and unpredictable
since there was very little debate and no committee reports or legislative hear-
ings related to the addition of “sex.” Id.
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the “sex” amendment.23 Those amendments received a concurrence
from the House on July 2, 1964, and President Johnson signed the bill
into law.24
The inclusion of sex in Title VII has made a marked difference both
within the workplace and in work opportunities for women. While
only approximately 38% of women participated in the labor force in
1963, within ten years that number increased to 45%.25 Such a rapid
change after the passage of Title VII can be attributed in part to the
prohibition of discrimination,26 which in turn created more employ-
ment opportunities and safe work environments for women.27 These
opportunities and safe environments continued to increase throughout
the years with the passage of supplementary law such as The Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act of 197828 and judicial interpretative expan-
sions of Title VII.29 As a result of the increased protections in
23. Vaas, supra note 19, at 442, 446–57.
24. Id. at 457.
25. Women in the Labor Force, Labor Force Participation Rate by Sex, Race and His-
panic Ethnicity, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/wb/stats/NEWSTATS/facts/
women_lf.htm#two [https://perma.unl.edu/T8U4-GRKQ] [hereinafter Women in
the Labor Force].
26. Increases of women in the labor force can be attributed to a combination of causes
including increases in national productivity and economic growth, “[t]he civil
rights movement, legislation promoting equal opportunity in employment, and
the women’s rights movement.” Mitra Toossi, A Century of Change: The U.S. La-
bor Force, 1950–2050, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 2002, at 15, 18.
27. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544–47 (1971) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring) (per curiam) (“By adding the prohibition against job discrim-
ination based on sex to the 1964 Civil Rights Act Congress intended to prevent
employers from refusing ‘to hire an individual based on stereotyped characteriza-
tions of the sexes.’”) (citing EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex,
29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a)(i)(ii)).
28. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 was passed as an amendment to Title
VII and prohibits discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, child-
birth, or related medical conditions” as a legislative expansion of the enumerated
category of “sex.” Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92
Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)). Before the enact-
ment of this statute, discrimination based on pregnancy was held to be permissi-
ble. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 128 (1976) (holding that the
exclusion of “pregnancy-related disability benefits from General Electric’s em-
ployee disability plan” does not violate Title VII).
29. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (holding
that a claim of sexual harassment by a coworker of the same sex is permitted
under Title VII’s protection of sex); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
250–51 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that a claim of gender stereotyping dis-
crimination is permitted under Title VII’s protection of sex); Meritor Sav. Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (holding that an employee’s claim of “hos-
tile environment” sex discrimination is permitted under Title VII’s protection of
sex); City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710–11 (1978)
(holding that a claim of discrimination based on longevity calculations in a pen-
sion plan is permitted under Title VII’s protection of sex).
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accordance with the purpose of Title VII, as of 2015, 57% of women
were participating in the labor force.30
While Title VII has fulfilled its purpose for many individuals, it
has failed to protect a significant portion of the workforce—those who
identify with a sexual orientation other than heterosexual.31 This
Note focuses on that portion of the workforce.
2. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Title VII
Though the Supreme Court has made many beneficial interpreta-
tive expansions to Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination based on
sex,32 it has not yet addressed whether sexual orientation discrimina-
tion is prohibited as a form of discrimination based on sex.33 As noted
in subsection II.A.1, the addition of the category of sex to Title VII was
made within hours of the vote in the House of Representatives.34 This
30. Women in the Labor Force, supra note 25.
31. As of 2011, the number of lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (LGBT) persons
in the workforce was greater than eight million people or around 4% of the
workforce. Jennifer C. Pizer, Brad Sears, Christy Mallory & Nan D. Hunter, Evi-
dence of Persistent and Pervasive Workplace Discrimination Against LGBT Peo-
ple: The Need for Federal Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination and Providing
for Equal Employment Benefits, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 719 (2012). However,
the number of LGBT persons in the workforce could potentially be much higher
than 4% since it is estimated that approximately 53% of LGBT persons may be
“closeted” on the job. HRC Study Shows Majority of LGBT Workers Closeted at
the Workplace, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (May 7, 2014), https://www.hrc.org/blog/hrc-
study-shows-majority-of-lgbt-workers-closeted-on-the-job [https://perma.unl.edu/
59CF-HJKY].
32. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82 (holding that same-sex sexual harassment is unlawful
discrimination based on sex under Title VII); Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Con-
trols, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 (1991) (holding that a policy barring women who
were of the age to bear children from performing certain job duties because of a
potential harm to the fetus is unlawful discrimination unless it is a bona fide
occupational qualification); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250–51 (plurality opin-
ion) (holding that a claim of gender stereotyping discrimination is permitted
under Title VII’s protection of sex); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB, 477 U.S. at 73  (hold-
ing that a claim of sexual harassment by a coworker of the same sex is permitted
under Title VII’s protection of sex); City of L.A., Dep’t. of Water & Power, 435
U.S. at 710–11 (holding that a claim of discrimination based on longevity calcula-
tions in a pension plan is permitted under Title VII’s protection of sex); Gen. Elec.
Co., 429 U.S. at 145–46 (holding that a company-provided insurance plan that
covers employees for disability and sickness but does not cover disabilities arising
from pregnancy is not prohibited discrimination based on sex); Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per curiam) (holding that discrimina-
tion based on sex includes discriminatory hiring qualifications related to other
factors such as having young children).
33. However, on June 1, 2018, Altitude Express, Inc. petitioned the U.S. Supreme
Court for writ of certiorari in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018). Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, 2018 WL 2558416 (No. 17-1623).
34. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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resulted in very little debate on the issue and no committee reports or
legislative hearings, thus leaving interpretation of the category to the
judiciary.35 The text of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act does not explic-
itly protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation.36 Al-
though the Supreme Court has not yet addressed specifically whether
discrimination based on sexual orientation is prohibited as discrimi-
nation based on sex, it has vitally expanded the application of Title
VII in its landmark cases Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins37 and Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.38—both of which could be inter-
preted by courts to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination, as the
Seventh Circuit did.
In Price Waterhouse, senior manager Ann Hopkins had been pro-
posed for a position as partner in her accounting firm.39 At the time of
her proposal for the partnership position, only 7 of the 662 partners at
the firm were female and Hopkins was the only female out of the 88
employees proposed for partnership that year.40 Despite her accom-
plishments and contributions to the firm—attested to by those who
proposed her for the position—the firm did not give her the position
and instead held her for reconsideration at a later time.41 Many of her
reviews indicated that people did not recommend her for the position
because of biases based on sex stereotypes.42 The Supreme Court held
that making an employment decision based on sex stereotypes is a
form of impermissible discrimination based on sex under Title VII.43
In Oncale, employee Joseph Oncale was the target of sex-related
harassment from three male coworkers, two of whom also had super-
visory authority.44 After he quit because of the continued harassment,
Oncale sued his employer, Sundowner Offshore Services, under Title
35. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
36. Title VII makes it unlawful “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual
. . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
37. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228.
38. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
39. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 231.
40. Id. at 233.
41. Id. at 233–34.
42. Id. at 234–37. Hopkins’ reviews included statements that she was “macho,” that
she “overcompensated for being a woman,” that she should take “a course at
charm school,” that she could improve her chances for the partnership position if
she would “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely,
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.” Id. at 235 (citing Hopkins
v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (1985)).
43. Id. at 250–52 (“An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose
positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible
catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not.
Title VII lifts women out of this bind.”).
44. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 77 (1998).
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VII for discrimination based on sex.45 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted summary judg-
ment for Sundowner Offshore Services stating that Oncale did not
have a cause of action as a male for sexual harassment by other males
in the workplace, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed on appeal.46 The Su-
preme Court reversed and remanded the Fifth Circuit’s decision, con-
cluding that an employee has a viable claim of sex discrimination
under Title VII if the employee was the target of same-sex sexual
harassment.47
Neither Price Waterhouse nor Oncale explicitly addressed whether
claims of sex stereotyping or same-sex sexual harassment could also
apply to discrimination based on one’s sexual orientation. Since the
Supreme Court answers narrow questions presented, lower federal
courts are able to interpret peripheral or related issues, such as
whether discrimination based on sexual orientation is included within
Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination based on sex.48 Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have independently addressed
whether sexual orientation is protected under Title VII, as discussed
in sections II.B and II.C.
B. Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, 853 F.3d 339 (7th
Cir. 2017)
In Hively 2, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation is prohibited as a form of sex
discrimination under Title VII.49 It was the first circuit to make this
45. Id.
46. Id. In affirming the District Court’s decision, the Fifth Circuit followed precedent
in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, where the Fifth Circuit, following its
unpublished decision in Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., held that “[h]arassment by a
male supervisor against a male subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII
even though the harassment has sexual overtones.” 28 F.3d 446, 451–52 (5th Cir.
1994) (quoting Giddens, No. 92–8533, 12 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. Dec. 6, 1993)).
47. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79 (“We see no justification in the statutory language or our
precedents for a categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment claims from the
coverage of Title VII. As some courts have observed, male-on-male sexual harass-
ment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was con-
cerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions often go beyond
the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils . . . .”).
48. Article III, Section One of the Constitution vests all judicial power in the Su-
preme Court “and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish” such as the federal circuit courts. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1,
cl. 1. Section Two extends that judicial power to “all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution [and] the Laws of the United States,” which
would include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Thus,
inferior federal courts are able to interpret provisions of Title VII unless the Su-
preme Court has already explicitly interpreted the issue presented.
49. Hively 2, 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2017).
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determination.50 Kimberly Hively identified as homosexual and was
an adjunct professor at Ivy Tech Community College in Indiana.51 She
began teaching part-time in 2000 and applied for multiple full-time
positions with the college between 2009 and 2014.52 Ivy Tech rejected
Hively for all of the positions for which she applied and ultimately did
not ask Hively to return as a professor after her then-existing contract
ended in July 2014.53
In December of 2013, after Ivy Tech did not offer her a position or
renew her contract, Hively filed a pro se charge under Title VII with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.54 In her claim, she
stated that she believed she was unsuccessful in her applications for a
full time position because she was being discriminated against based
on her sexual orientation, which she argued violated her rights under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.55 Hively received her right-to-
sue letter and filed her case pro se in district court.56 The district
court granted Ivy Tech’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
on which relief could be granted because of established precedent in
the Seventh Circuit prohibiting Title VII claims based on sexual
orientation.57
50. Id. at 340–41 (“For many years, the courts of appeals of this country understood
the prohibition against sex discrimination to exclude discrimination on the basis
of a person’s sexual orientation. . . . [W]e have been asked to take a fresh look at
our position in light of developments at the Supreme Court . . . . [A]nd we con-
clude today that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex
discrimination.”); Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255–57 (11th Cir.
2017); Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 471 (6th Cir. 2012); Prowel v.
Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285 289–90 (3d Cir. 2009); Medina v. Income
Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Title VII’s protections . . . do
not extend to harassment due to a person’s sexuality”); Higgins v. New Balance
Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 258–59 (1st Cir. 1999); Fredette v. BVP Mgmt.
Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1997); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am.,
Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) (permitting a claim of discrimination based
on sex where a heterosexual employee was allegedly harassed by his homosexual
employer, but acknowledging that relief would not extend to discrimination if the
employee were homosexual); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d
69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979).
51. Hively 2, 853 F.3d at 341.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. A claimant who files a charge with the EEOC alleging discrimination under
Title VII will receive a “Notice-of-Right-to-Sue” if he or she has a viable claim,
thus allowing the claimant to file a lawsuit in court. Filing a Lawsuit, EEOC,
https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfm [https://perma.unl.edu/UV7U-
2ZZN].
57. Hively 2, 853 F.3d at 341; Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc.,
224 F.3d 701, (7th Cir. 2000); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080 (7th
Cir. 2000). Hively’s case was dismissed with prejudice. Id.
2018] HIVELY V. IVY TECH COMMUNITY COLLEGE 235
Hively appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, with the
assistance of the Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund.58 A three-
judge panel ultimately affirmed the district court’s dismissal accord-
ing to established precedent in the Seventh Circuit.59 However, in ex-
tensive dicta, Circuit Judge Rovner noted that drawing a line which
fails to include Title VII claims based on sexual orientation discrimi-
nation, but does include claims based on sex stereotyping discrimina-
tion, lacked any logical basis.60 The three judge panel was ultimately
unable to overturn precedent, regardless of its acknowledgement of
potential valid claims of a similar nature and administrative support
from the EEOC to recognize sexual orientation protection under the
enumerated category of sex.61
A majority of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals judges then
voted to rehear the case en banc.62 Upon rehearing the case, the Sev-
enth Circuit reversed and remanded the decision of the district court,
holding that “a person who alleges that she experienced employment
discrimination on the basis of her sexual orientation has put forth a
case of sex discrimination for Title VII purposes.”63 The purpose of
Title VII is to protect employees from discrimination and create equal-
ity in the workplace. Thus, rehearing Hively 1 en banc in order to
overturn precedent and prohibit sexual orientation discrimination
was the correct approach.
C. Circuit Split
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was the first circuit to over-
turn the consistent precedent of denying claims of sexual orientation
discrimination under Title VII. Almost every other circuit has rou-
tinely denied claims of sexual orientation discrimination.64
58. Hively 2, 853 F.3d at 341.
59. Hively 1, 830 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We are presumptively bound by our
own precedent . . . .”).
60. Id. at 704–06 (“For those courts, if the lines between the two are not easily dis-
cernible, the right answer is to forego any effort to tease apart the two claims and
simply dismiss the claim . . . .”).
61. Id. at 702–03 (acknowledging the EEOC’s recently released decision where it held
that “sexual orientation is inherently a ‘sex-based consideration’” and that dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation is therefore prohibited under Title VII’s
enumerated category of sex) (quoting Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL
4397641, at *5 (E.E.O.C. July 16, 2015)).
62. Hively 2, 853 F.3d at 342–43 (noting that while “the panel correctly noted that it
was bound by [the Seventh Circuit’s] precedents,” the court could choose to re-
hear the case en banc “to overrule earlier decisions and to bring our law into
conformity with the Supreme Court’s teachings”).
63. Id. at 351–52. This Note analyzes the most persuasive arguments of the majority,
two concurrences, and dissent.
64. Hively 1, 830 F.3d at 701; Evans v. Ga Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255–57 (11th
Cir. 2017); Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 471 (6th Cir. 2012);
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For instance, the Eleventh Circuit held in Evans v. Georgia Re-
gional Hospital that a claim for sexual orientation discrimination
under Title VII could not proceed.65 The Evans decision is typical of
how cases similar to Hively are handled by courts. The Evans plaintiff
made a Title VII claim of discrimination against her former employer
based on the fact that she was discriminated against (1) because of
gender nonconformity and (2) because of her sexual orientation.66 The
plaintiff worked as a security officer at a hospital and alleged that she
was “denied equal pay or work, harassed, and physically assaulted or
battered,” in part because she did not “carry herself in a ‘traditional
woman[ly] manner.’”67 She identified as a gay woman, and although
she did not openly state her sexual orientation, her employer and co-
workers noticed that she wore a male uniform, had a short haircut,
and wore masculine shoes.68 After she submitted complaints about
the treatment she received, her human resources manager asked her
directly about her sexuality.69 Furthermore, she alleged that she was
discriminated against for speaking to her human resources manager
about her employer’s discriminatory behaviors.70
The magistrate judge assigned to her case issued a “report and rec-
ommendation” based on what she had alleged and the list of incidents
that she provided.71 Regarding her sexual orientation discrimination
claim, the judge stated that Title VII “was not intended to cover dis-
crimination against homosexuals.”72 Regarding her gender noncon-
formity claim, the judge stated that it was “just another way to claim
discrimination based on sexual orientation.”73 After doing a de novo
review of her case, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
recommendation and dismissed her case with prejudice.74 On appeal,
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the
plaintiff’s sexual orientation discrimination claim because of existing
Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285 289–90 (3d Cir. 2009); Medina v.
Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Higgins v. New Bal-
ance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 258–59 (1st Cir. 1999); Fredette v. BVP
Mgmt. Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1997); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of
Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons,
Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938
(5th Cir. 1979).
65. Evans, 850 F.3d 1248.
66. Id. at 1251.
67. Id.
68. Id. (“Although she is a gay woman, she did not broadcast her sexuality. However,
it was ‘evident’ that she identified with the male gender, because of how she
presented herself—[sic](‘male uniform, low male haircut, shoes, etc.’).”).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1251–52.
72. Id. at 1252.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1253.
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precedent in the circuit that does not permit a claim of sexual orienta-
tion discrimination under Title VII.75
Similarly, the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits have all rejected claims of discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation as a subset of sex under Title VII.76 Courts have continued to
rule this way, rejecting any claim related to sexual orientation, be-
cause of established precedent prohibiting such claims.77
However, there has been a trend toward permitting claims of dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation in the past few years. First,
the EEOC announced that it considers sexual orientation discrimina-
tion a subcategory of the enumerated category of sex and therefore
prohibited it under Title VII.78 Next, the Second Circuit determined
that a person’s claim of sexual orientation discrimination was suffi-
cient to withstand dismissal because it presented a plausible claim of
sex stereotyping, a decision that it made in light of the evolution of
societal understanding of same-sex relationships and Supreme Court
cases which have given more protection to homosexual individuals.79
Finally, the Seventh Circuit held in Hively 2 that discrimination
based on sexual orientation is a viable claim under Title VII.80 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently took the same action as the
Seventh Circuit in Hively 2 by rehearing Zarda v. Altitude Express,
75. Id. at 1255–57. The court reinforced its decision by listing similar decisions by its
sister circuits. Id. at 1256–57. In the established precedent of Blum v. Gulf Oil
Corp., the court held that “[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title
VII.” 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979).
76. See cases cited supra note 64.
77. See discussion infra section III.A.
78. Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015).
Courts are not bound to follow the decisions and guidance of the EEOC, but may
grant it deference when hearing cases. Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise:
The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1937 (2006). Most often,
courts will apply the Skidmore standard of deference to EEOC interpretations,
and since that standard is malleable (containing multiple factors to be weighed
by the court), courts usually do not grant deference and reject the EEOC interpre-
tation presented. Id. at 1941, 1945 (referring to Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134 (1944)).
79. Christiansen v. Omnicom Group, Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 206–07 (2d Cir. 2017)
(Katzmann, J., concurring) (“[I]n the context of an appropriate case our Court
should consider reexamining the holding that sexual orientation discrimination
claims are not cognizable under Title VII.”). The Second Circuit three-judge panel
noted that while the plaintiff could not claim sexual orientation discrimination
because it was inappropriate for the panel to overturn established precedent, the
plaintiff could plausibly allege a claim of sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Id. at 199–200. The Second Circuit has, indeed,
followed through on its statement that it should reexamine its treatment of sex-
ual orientation discrimination under Title VII by rehearing Zarda v. Altitude Ex-
press en banc, just as the Seventh Circuit did in Hively 2. Order Granting
Rehearing En Banc, 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017).
80. Hively 2, 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2017).
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Inc.—a case involving a similar claim—en banc on September 26,
2017.81 In an opinion released on February 26, 2018, the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals took the same action as the Seventh Circuit by
using the court en banc to overturn established precedent and hold
that sexual orientation discrimination is prohibited under Title VII as
a form of discrimination based on sex.82
Though most circuits have held that there is no viable claim of dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation under Title VII, the trend to-
ward allowing such a claim should continue in the footsteps of the
Seventh Circuit in order to advance the purpose of Title VII.
III. ANALYSIS
The Seventh Circuit correctly held that sexual orientation discrim-
ination is prohibited as a form of discrimination based on sex under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. That holding was the correct
interpretation of Title VII’s overall purpose of protecting employees
and creating equality in the workplace by prohibiting discrimination
based on five broad enumerated categories: race, color, religion, sex,
and national origin.83 That broad purpose is furthered by protecting
employees from sexual orientation discrimination using judicial inter-
pretative expansions that have occurred since the passage of Title
VII,84 as well as the accepted Title VII claims of gender nonconformity
(also known as sex stereotyping)85 and associational discrimination.86
Furthermore, policy implications weigh in favor of prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination under Title VII in light of the innate nature
of one’s sexual identity; the historic animus toward those who identify
as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgendered; and the need for protec-
tion from that animus as it continues today.87
The proper way for other circuits to align themselves with the Sev-
enth Circuit and standardize the law in order to achieve the broad
goal of Title VII is to rehear a case involving a sexual orientation dis-
crimination claim, like Hively 1, en banc to overturn established
precedent.
81. See supra note 79.
82. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018). The Second Circuit
goes on to make it clear that “this Court’s holding that sexual orientation discrim-
ination is a subset of sex discrimination encompasses discrimination based on a
person’s attraction to people of the opposite sex, same sex, or both.” Id. at 114
n.10.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012); see discussion supra subsection II.A.1.
84. See cases cited supra note 29.
85. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); see discussion infra section
III.C.
86. See discussion infra section III.D.
87. Hively 1, 830 F.3d 698, 714 (7th Cir. 2016); see discussion infra section III.E.
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A. Departure from Precedent
Title VII claims of employment discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation as a subset of sex have repeatedly failed in courts primarily
because of established binding precedent in those circuits.88 Because
precedent cannot easily be overruled,89 claims of employment discrim-
ination based on sexual orientation frequently fail upon the em-
ployer’s motion to dismiss90 or motion for summary judgment.91 When
a plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief that is supported by existing
law, including previous rulings in the circuit, a court is bound by its
own precedent and may not rule otherwise.92
Therefore, if precedent is established in a circuit court, courts
within that circuit are bound by it.93 Courts are required to give con-
siderable weight to established precedent in their circuit until it has
been overruled by the decision of a superior court94 or superseded by
another legislative development, such as a congressional amendment
to the statute.95 One such supervening development occurred in
Hively 2—a rehearing en banc of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
88. See cases cited supra note 64.
89. Hively 2, 853 F.3d 339, 342–43 (7th Cir. 2017) (stating that the three-judge panel
was required to follow precedent “until the writing comes in the form of a Su-
preme Court opinion or new legislation,” but that a full court has the power to
rehear an issue en banc in order to overrule earlier decisions); see also Joseph W.
Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 NEV. L.J. 787,
798 (2012) (“However, an entire circuit is not forever bound by a three-judge deci-
sion. The en banc procedure allows all active judges to sit and decide a single
case. Sitting en banc, circuit judges are not bound by prior panel decisions, but
may give some deference to well-entrenched precedent.”).
90. Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is a “defense to a claim for
relief,” which can be asserted by motion for “failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted,” in cases such as ones claiming discrimination based on
sexual orientation in jurisdictions where precedent holds that it is not a viable
claim under Title VII.
91. Summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is as-
serted by motion. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. In cases such as ones claiming discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation in jurisdictions where precedent holds that is not
a viable claim under Title VII, the movant’s motion will be granted if he or she
shows that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact,” which means
“the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
92. Hively 1, 830 F.3d at 701.
93. Id. at 701; see also Christiansen v. Omnicom Group, Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 199 (2d
Cir. 2017) (stating that “it [is] ordinarily . . . neither appropriate nor possible for
[a panel] to reverse an existing Circuit precedent” (alteration in original) (quoting
Shipping Corp. of India Ltd.v. Jaldhi Overseas Pte Ltd., 585 F.3d 58, 67 (2d Cir.
2009))); Mead, supra note 89, at 794–98 (describing the “law of the circuit” rule as
an applicable subset of horizontal stare decisis for panel rulings within a circuit).
94. Hively 2, 853 F.3d at 342 (“Notable in its absence from the debate over the proper
interpretation of the scope of Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination is the United
States Supreme Court.”).
95. Id. (citing Santos v. United States, 461 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2006)).
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Hively 1, which allowed that circuit to overturn precedent.96 By using
the power of the court en banc, the Seventh Circuit was able to rehear
an issue that was dismissed based on established precedent in order to
align the law with the purpose of Title VII and what Title VII is de-
signed to protect in the employment context.97
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit established new precedent.98 Cir-
cuit courts should follow the Seventh Circuit’s lead by rehearing cases
similar to Hively 1 en banc in order to overturn precedent and prop-
erly interpret Title VII to further its purpose of protecting employees
from discrimination in the workplace.99 Otherwise, the Supreme
Court will have to judicially resolve the circuit split by hearing a case
similar to Hively 2100 or Zarda101 and make a nationally binding deci-
sion regarding this Title VII issue. It is unclear how the Supreme
Court would resolve this issue, given the significant personnel
changes that have taken place in its recent history. However, in light
of the interpretive expansions that the Supreme Court has already
made in the Title VII context102 and other decisions expanding rights
and protections of same-sex couples,103 it is possible that the Supreme
96. Id. at 343 (stating that by “recognizing the power of the full court to overrule
earlier decisions and to bring our law into conformity with the Supreme Court’s
teachings, a majority of the judges in regular active service voted to rehear this
case en banc” and ultimately overturning established precedent that discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation was permissible under Title VII).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 341.
99. On September 26, 2017, the Second Circuit, following in the procedural footsteps
of the Seventh Circuit, reheard en banc a three judge panel’s decision in Zarda v.
Altitude Express, 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017) that discrimination based on sexual
orientation is not prohibited under Title VII. See Order Granting Rehearing En
Banc, supra note 79. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was the second circuit
to do so, and it reversed the decision of the three judge panel that did not allow a
claim of sexual orientation discrimination, thereby aligning with the Seventh Cir-
cuit in holding that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimina-
tion prohibited by Title VII. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir.
2018).
100. Hively 2, 853 F.3d at 340–42 (noting the Supreme Court’s absence in the discus-
sion of this Title VII issue, but acknowledging that the Supreme Court has pub-
lished several opinions indicating the support of protections for homosexual
individuals and same-sex couples).
101. See Zarda, 855 F.3d 76; see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 33 and accompanying
text.
102. For the two most relevant examples of interpretative expansions that support the
prohibition of sexual orientation discrimination, see supra subsection II.A.2.
103. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding same-sex couples
have a fundamental right to marry under the U.S. Constitution); Hollingsworth
v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) (holding petitioners did not have standing to chal-
lenge the United States District Court for the Northern District of California’s
decision that eliminating the right of same-sex couples to marry was a violation
of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (holding that the
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Court would continue that progression by prohibiting sexual orienta-
tion discrimination under Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination
based on sex.”
B. Interpretation
Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to protect
employees from discrimination in the workplace.104 Congress speci-
fied to whom these protections extended by enumerating five broad
categories: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.105 Despite ar-
guments that “sex” should be interpreted as simply distinguishing be-
tween persons who are genetically male and female,106 the term has
been repeatedly expanded through judicial interpretation to reflect
the broad purpose of Title VII.107 Because the Supreme Court has not
explicitly ruled on the issue of whether discrimination based on sexual
orientation is prohibited under Title VII’s protection against sex dis-
crimination,108 circuit courts have been left to interpret Title VII and
apply related Title VII cases to this unresolved issue.109
The Seventh Circuit properly interpreted Title VII’s category of sex
to include protection for those discriminated against because of their
sexual orientation. This conclusion is supported by interpretative ex-
pansions of what is considered to be discrimination based on sex under
Title VII, burdens of proof that enable plaintiffs’ access to remedies, as
Defense of Marriage Act’s definitions of “marriage” as only a union between a
man and a woman and “spouse” as only a person of the opposite sex were uncon-
stitutional under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution).
104. See discussion supra subsection II.A.1.
105. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964).
106. A common canon of statutory interpretation is to interpret words in light of their
common meaning. Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870, 876 (2014); Perrin
v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). This canon of interpretation is discussed
in more detail infra subsection III.B.2.
107. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (holding
that a claim of sexual harassment by a coworker of the same sex is permitted
under Title VII’s protection of sex); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989) (holding that a claim of gender stereotyping discrimination is permitted
under Title VII’s protection of sex); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57 (1986) (holding that an employee’s claim of “hostile environment” sexual har-
assment is permitted under Title VII’s protection of sex); City of L.A. Dep’t of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (holding that a claim of discrimi-
nation based on longevity calculations in a pension plan is permitted under Title
VII’s protection of sex).
108. See discussion supra subsection II.A.2.
109. See generally Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (holding that a claim of gender ster-
eotyping discrimination is permitted under Title VII’s protection of sex); Oncale,
523 U.S. 75 (holding that same-sex sexual harassment is unlawful discrimination
based on sex under Title VII).
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well as the evolution of understanding since 1964 with regard to those
who identify as non-heterosexual.
1. Broad Goal of Title VII
The purpose of Title VII is to protect employees and create equality
in the workplace, where there were significant disparities before, by
prohibiting discrimination based on five broad enumerated categories:
“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”110 Specific to prohibi-
tions of employment discrimination in Title VII, the five categories are
to be interpreted broadly.111 One piece of evidence of the legislature’s
intention of broad interpretation is the burden of proof that the plain-
tiff bears to prove discrimination based on an enumerated category.112
Disparate treatment can be proved either by use of direct evidence
or inferential proof.113 Since direct evidence of discrimination is often
not available or accepted, inferential proof is more commonly used in
discrimination lawsuits.114 Two common claims that require inferen-
tial proof are disparate treatment claims using the McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green framework,115 or mixed motives disparate
treatment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
In a disparate treatment claim using the McDonnell Douglas
framework, plaintiffs have a relatively low burden of proof, which is
met if they demonstrate that they (1) belong to the particular class for
which they allege they have been discriminated against, (2) applied
for the job and were qualified for the position, (3) were rejected despite
their qualifications, and (4) after their rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants.116 Once this is
established, the burden shifts to the defendant employer to state a
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); discussion supra subsection II.A.1.
111. Sandoval v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., Inc., 578 F.3d 787, 792–93 (8th Cir. 2009)
(“Title VII of the Civil Rights act of 1964 is to be accorded a liberal construction in
order to carry out the purposes of Congress to eliminate the inconvenience, un-
fairness and humiliation of . . . discrimination.”) (citing Baker v. Stuart Broad.
Co., 560 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1977)).
112. For purposes of this Note I am focusing on disparate treatment claims, not dispa-
rate impact claims, since those are the types of claims usually brought in sex
discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination cases.
113. HAROLD S. LEWIS JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
AND PRACTICE 164–74 (2d ed. 2001). The easiest way for a plaintiff to prove dis-
crimination is by direct evidence such as “epithets or slurs uttered by an author-
ized agent of the employer, a decisionmaker’s admission that he [or she] would or
did act against the plaintiff because of his or her protected characteristic, or, even
more clearly, an employer policy framed squarely in terms of race, sex, religion,
or national origin.” Id. at 165.
114. Id. at 179 (“Because direct evidence of intent has . . . been so rarely accepted,
courts have recognized alternative ways of establishing unlawful
discrimination.”).
115. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
116. Id. at 802; see LEWIS, supra note 113, at 184–85.
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nondiscriminatory reason for its allegedly discriminatory action.117 If
the defendant employer meets its burden of proof, the burden switches
back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s reason was merely
pretext.118 By allowing the plaintiff to prove his or her prima facie
case with the four simple elements and to rebut the defendant em-
ployer’s rationale by using circumstantial evidence to prove it is a pre-
text for an actual discriminatory purpose, plaintiffs are easily able to
present their cases and seek relief in court.
In a mixed motives disparate treatment case under Title VII, the
plaintiff must “demonstrate[ ] that race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice.”119 When this
burden of proof is met, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that
he or she would have taken the action at issue based solely on his or
her stated legitimate reason.120 By clarifying that the employer’s dis-
crimination merely has to be a “motivating factor” of the employer’s
discrimination rather than the sole factor, plaintiffs’ access to reme-
dies in these circumstances is much easier to obtain. Furthermore, en-
abled access to remedies reflects Congress’s broad goal of protecting
employees from discrimination.
In addition to the legislature’s intention to enable access to reme-
dies based on the burden of proof required by parties in a Title VII
suit, the Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII protection
broadly.121 In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc., the Su-
preme Court found that Congress’s overall goal of passing Title VII
and prohibiting discrimination based on sex was to provide broad pro-
tections by “strik[ing] at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women in employment.”122 In Oncale, the plaintiff was sexu-
ally harassed and abused by his male coworkers, who also had super-
visory roles, and their superiors took no action to stop the sexual
117. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
118. See id. at 804–05 (stating further that the plaintiff can use evidence to prove
pretext, including evidence of other employees being rehired after acting in the
way that—according to the defendant—resulted in the plaintiff not being re-
hired; “the [employer]’s treatment of [plaintiff] during his prior term of employ-
ment; [employer]’s reaction, if any, to [plaintiff]’s legitimate civil rights activities;
and [employer]’s general policy and practice with respect to minority
employment.”).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
120. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989) (stating that “[a]n em-
ployer may not, in other words, prevail in a mixed-motives case by offering a
legitimate and sufficient reason for its decision” and that therefore “[t]he em-
ployer instead must show that its legitimate reason, standing alone, would have
induced it to make the same decision”).
121. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
122. Id. at 78 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).
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harassment, even after he reported the incidents.123 The Supreme
Court overturned the Fifth Circuit’s decision that a male could not
have a viable claim of discrimination based on sex against coworkers
of the same sex.124 The Court ruled that discrimination by a male co-
worker of a male employee is discrimination based on sex even though
it was “assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with
when it enacted Title VII.”125
This acknowledgement of original congressional intent in conjunc-
tion with the Court’s determination that the original intent was not
determinative reinforces that the most important concept with which
to interpret Title VII is the broad goal of protecting employees from
discrimination based on sex. Reading Title VII broadly advances Title
VII’s purpose of protecting employees from discriminatory behavior
and creating equality in the workplace.
2. Broadening Title VII Interpretations
Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination based on sex has been sub-
ject to broad interpretive expansions in order to align with the overall
purpose of Title VII. These interpretive expansions have been taken
despite arguments that they are unsupported by the legislative his-
tory of Title VII. Much attention has been drawn to the fact that there
is “little legislative history to guide [courts] in interpreting the Act’s
prohibition against discrimination based on ‘sex.’”126 However, as the
Seventh Circuit points out, legislative history is “notoriously
malleable.”127
Furthermore, reliance on legislative history and failed attempts to
change a law128 can can draw many different conclusions, including a
general lack of a need for a proposed change because the existing law
provides sufficient coverage, a lack of desire for a legislative change
because a majority of the legislature is content with how courts inter-
preting the statute understand its provisions, or “irrelevance of the
non-enactment, when it is attributable to nothing more than legisla-
123. Id. at 77.
124. Id. at 79.
125. Id.
126. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
127. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 343 (7th Cir. 2017).
128. The Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), which, if it had passed, would
have explicitly prohibited employment discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion, was first proposed in Congress in 1994 and was proposed for the final time
in 2013. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, S. 2238, 103d Cong.
(1994); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. (2013).
The most recent iteration of a bill prohibiting employment discrimination based
on sexual orientation is the Equality Act, which would amend the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to remove the word “sex” and insert “sex, sexual orientation, gender
identity.” H.R. 2282, 115th Cong. § 7 (2017). The Equality Act was introduced in
the House of Representatives on May 2, 2017 and is currently pending. Id.
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tive logrolling or gridlock that had nothing to do with its merits.”129
Legislative histories can also be a misleading guide in the interpreta-
tion of a statute when they are analyzed as part of a bill that does not
become law because they do not reflect actual intent of the affirmative
law being interpreted.130 Therefore, the Hively 2 dissent’s use of
newer legislation, including the Violence Against Women Act, which
explicitly protects sexual orientation,131 is not proof that the 1964
Congress’s failure to add protection from discrimination based on sex-
ual orientation to Title VII was intentional. Since Congress’s failure
could be interpreted in varying ways, attempting to use legislative his-
tories does not provide insight into Congress’s precise intent or how it
would want to treat sexual orientation under Title VII today.
One of the primary arguments against prohibiting sexual orienta-
tion discrimination under Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination
is that those who passed the Civil Rights Act in 1964 did not contem-
plate sexual preference when they wrote the protection of sex into the
Act.132 The Supreme Court has stated “a fundamental canon of statu-
tory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be inter-
preted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”133
The argument is rooted in the idea that the judiciary should show re-
straint in interpreting a statute by first looking at the understanding
at the time of enactment.134 People who rely on the original interpre-
tation argument believe the judiciary is “not authorized to infuse the
text with a new or unconventional meaning or to update it to respond
to changed social, economic, or political conditions.”135
129. Hively 2, 853 F.3d at 343–44. See Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use
of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 376–79 (1987), for a discussion on the
practical concerns of using legislative histories in interpreting a statute.
130. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (respond-
ing to the use of amendments to ERISA effected by the Pension Protection Act in
interpreting a prior statute); see also Starr, supra note 129, at 376 (“The most
compelling and widely discussed concern about the use of legislative history is its
potential for manipulation. It is often said that one generally finds in the legisla-
tive history only that for which one is looking.”).
131. Hively 2, 853 F.3d at 363 (Sykes, C.J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 13925(b)(13)(A)).
132. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984).
133. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979); Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134
S. Ct. 870, 876 (2014).
134. Hively 2, 853 F.3d at 360 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
135. Id. The late Justice Scalia, who was a staunch originalist, believed the Constitu-
tion and statutes should be interpreted in light of the meaning at the time of
adoption. See Richard F. Duncan, Justice Scalia and the Rule of Law: Original-
ism vs. the Living Constitution, 29 REGENT U. L. REV. 9, 15 (2016) (“The Constitu-
tion is a written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That which it
meant when adopted it means now.”) (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GAR-
NER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 81 (2012)).
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Despite those who urge that original intent is the only necessary
means of interpreting Title VII, that argument fails to acknowledge
how Title VII has repeatedly been broadly construed in light of its
overall purpose to protect employees and create equality in the work-
place by prohibiting discrimination based on sex. Furthermore, the so-
cial and relational underpinnings of people’s identification of “sex”
was not commonly understood when the Civil Rights Act was enacted
in 1964. To quote the great Justice Holmes, “we must consider what
this country has become in deciding what that [statute] has re-
served.”136 As Circuit Judge Posner points out in his concurrence in
Hively 2, “homosexuality was almost invisible in the 1960s” and did
not become visible until the 1980s when the AIDS epidemic brought it
to the forefront of America’s attention.137 Although the 1964 Congress
may not have considered sex to include sexual orientation, this omis-
sion was due to its lack of awareness and absence of information re-
garding homosexuality, not an affirmative decision to exclude sexual
orientation.
Interpretative expansions of statutory and constitutional law have
been commonly accepted as binding law since Blackstone offered his
commentaries on the law in 1765.138 More specifically, many interpre-
tations of Title VII that fall outside of the original narrow reading of
the word “sex” have been widely accepted as binding law.139 Some ex-
amples of these interpretive expansions with regard to Title VII dis-
crimination based on sex include the prohibition of sexual
136. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433–34 (1920) (arguing furthermore that “the
case before us must be considered in the light of out [sic] whole experience and
not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago” in interpreting the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act of July 3, 1918 and related regulations); see also
Hively 2, 853 F.3d at 356–57 (Posner, J., concurring) (paraphrasing Justice
Holmes’s words to apply to Title VII and the sexual orientation discrimination
context).
137. Hively 2, 853 F.3d at 353.
138. Judge Posner points out in his concurrence that even the late Justice Scalia, a
well-known originalist, was the fifth vote for the majority in Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989), which held burning the American flag as a political protest
is protected under the First Amendment, even though burning a flag is assuredly
not what the framers or ratifiers of that Amendment would have considered
“speech.” Id. at 353–54. Judge Posner also highlights in his concurrence the por-
tion of William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765) in
which Blackstone noted that even though a medieval law may say “whoever drew
blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity,” the law would
assuredly not apply to activities of medical surgeons, even though the legislators
had failed to account for them. Id. at 352.
139. Circuit Judge Sykes, writing for the dissent in Hively 2, cites to The American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, published in 1969, to emphasize
that at the time of enactment, “sex” was understood to be simply “[t]he property
or quality by which organisms are classified according to their reproductive func-
tions[;] [e]ither of two divisions, designated male and female, of this classifica-
tion.” Id. at 362–63.
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harassment,140 the prohibition of harassment by same-sex employ-
ees,141 prohibition of discrimination based on gender nonconform-
ity,142 and prohibition based on actuarial assumptions of a particular
sex’s lifespan.143
In light of the acceptance of interpretative expansions not only in
statutory and constitutional law generally, but specifically in Title
VII’s prohibition of discrimination based on sex, a purely originalist
argument about the framers’ understanding of the word “sex” is un-
persuasive. Furthermore, the broader understanding of what amounts
to discrimination based on sex under Title VII, as seen in judicial in-
terpretative expansions since its enactment in 1964, illustrates that
courts understand the enumerated category of sex to be a broad cate-
gory intended to protect as many employees as possible that are facing
discrimination in the workplace—not simply employees who are male
or female based only on their reproductive functions.144 Most impor-
tantly, an originalist interpretation of Title VII’s prohibition of dis-
crimination based on sex would unnecessarily limit that protection to
the extent that it would no longer be performing the Act’s overall pur-
pose of protecting employees and creating equality in the workplace by
“strik[ing] at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women in employment.”145
Continuing to interpret sex broadly, as courts have done since Title
VII’s passing, allows courts to “avoid statutory obsolescence”146 and
further the goals of Title VII. Courts have repeatedly expanded what
is protected under Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination based on
140. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
141. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
142. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (“As for the legal rele-
vance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an employer could evalu-
ate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype
associated with their group . . . .”); discussion infra section III.C.
143. In City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, the Supreme
Court analyzed an employment policy that “required its female employees to
make larger contributions to its pension fund than its male employees” because
“[a]s a class, women live longer than men.” 435 U.S. 702, 704 (1978). The Court
ultimately held that “[a]n employment practice that requires 2,000 individuals to
contribute more money into a fund than 10,000 other employees simply because
each of them is a woman, rather than a man, is in direct conflict with both the
language and the policy of the [Civil Rights] Act.” Id. at 711.
144. Hively 2, 853 F.3d at 362–63 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
145. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64).
146. Hively 2, 853 F.3d at 357 (Posner, J., concurring) (“I would prefer to see us ac-
knowledge openly that today we, who are judges rather than members of Con-
gress, are imposing on a half-century-old statute a meaning of ‘sex
discrimination’ that the Congress that enacted it would not have accepted. This is
something courts do fairly frequently to avoid statutory obsolescence and concom-
itantly to avoid placing the entire burden of updating old statutes on the legisla-
tive branch.”).
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sex, and the Seventh Circuit’s decision to protect employees from sex-
ual orientation discrimination in Hively 2 is an appropriate interpre-
tive expansion that aligns with Title VII’s purpose.
C. Gender Nonconformity Claim
One of the accepted interpretative expansions of Title VII’s prohi-
bition of discrimination based on sex is the prohibition of discrimina-
tion based on gender nonconformity, also known as sex
stereotyping.147 As the Seventh Circuit in Hively 2 correctly pointed
out, “Hively represents the ultimate case of failure to conform to the
female stereotype (at least as understood in a place such as modern
America, which views heterosexuality as the norm and other forms of
sexuality as exceptional): she is not heterosexual.”148 Thus, as a wo-
man who has relationships with other women rather than men—
where a woman who has relationships with men is thought of as “nor-
mal” and is more acceptable in social spheres—she is failing to con-
form to what the stereotypical woman would do. Under the precedent
established by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, Ti-
tle VII prohibits discrimination based on gender nonconformity as a
subset of sex discrimination, and plaintiffs like Hively should be suc-
cessful under such a claim.149
However, courts have repeatedly drawn an arbitrary line that al-
lows gender nonconformity claims, but does not allow sexual orienta-
tion to be categorized as gender nonconformity.150 Those courts
characterize the attempt to make a gender nonconformity claim be-
cause of the claimant’s failure to meet the appropriate gender stereo-
type due to his or her sexual orientation as an attempt to “bootstrap
protection for sexual orientation into Title VII.”151 However, this arbi-
trary distinction leads to odd and inconsistent results in claims that
are essentially the same. In effect, “If you look or act sufficiently ‘gay’
at work, you might currently find protection from discrimination in at
least half of the nation’s courts of appeals,” but on the other hand, if
“your coworkers or employers simply know or think you are gay, you
are not only unprotected under federal law, but your claim is that of a
‘bootstrapper’ trying to force sexual orientation into Title VII against
147. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
148. Hively 2, 853 F.3d at 346.
149. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258.
150. See Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218–19 (2d Cir. 2005); Vickers v.
Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762–65 (6th Cir. 2006). But see Terveer v. Bill-
ington, 34 F. Supp. 3d 100, 115–16 (D.D.C. 2014) (allowing the plaintiff’s claim to
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, primarily because of the
low hurdle required at the motion to dismiss stage of a trial, under a theory that
discrimination based on sexual orientation was discrimination based on gender
nonconformity).
151. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000).
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the will of Congress.”152 This distinction effectively makes the way
one looks or acts legally more important than the actual fact of one’s
sexual preferences, which in practice means that appearances are
given more protection than one’s actual sexual orientation or personal
identity.153
The Seventh Circuit properly interpreted the nature of discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation as being discrimination based on a
failure to conform to gender norms in finding that Hively could sup-
port a claim based on gender nonconformity under Title VII.154 The
court in Hively 2 found support from the arguments and dicta in
Hively 1. Though the three-judge panel in Hively 1 did not have the
ability to overturn precedent of its own accord and ultimately held
that Hively’s claim could not stand,155 it acknowledged that cases
holding that employees are not protected from discrimination based
on sexual orientation under Title VII are difficult to understand in
light of the prohibition of discrimination based on failure to conform to
gender norms—the two are so similar as to render an attempt to dis-
tinguish the two untenable.156 Furthermore, claims of discrimination
based on sexual orientation and gender nonconformity are indistin-
guishable because “all gay, lesbian and bisexual persons fail to comply
with the sine qua non of gender stereotypes—that all men should form
intimate relationships only with women, and all women should form
intimate relationships only with men.”157
152. Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for Title VII, 63 AM.
U.L. REV. 715, 716 (2014). The Second Circuit, in overturning precedent and
holding that sexual orientation discrimination is prohibited under Title VII, simi-
larly addresses the “unworkability” of its precedent and the inability of lower
courts to make a meaningful distinction between “gender stereotypes that sup-
port an inference of impermissible sex discrimination and those that are indica-
tive of sexual orientation discrimination.” Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883
F.3d 100, 121 (2d Cir. 2018). The court notes that “a woman might have a Title
VII claim if she was harassed or fired for being perceived as too ‘macho’ but not if
she was harassed or fired for being perceived as a lesbian.” Id. (quoting Fabian v.
Hosp. of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 524 n.8 (D. Conn. 2016)).
153. Soucek, supra note 152, at 717.
154. Hively 2, 853 F.3d 339, 346–47 (7th Cir. 2017).
155. Hively 1, 830 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2016).
156. See id. at 704–06.
157. Id. at 711. However, in his concurring opinion in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Cir-
cuit Judge Jacobs argues that there is no valid claim of sex stereotyping because
“[s]tereotypes are generalizations that are usually unfair or defective,” which is
distinguishable from sexual orientation discrimination because “[h]eterosexuality
and homosexuality are both traits that are innate and true, not stereotypes of
anything else.” Zarda, 883 F.3d at 134 (Jacobs, J., concurring). This view of sex
stereotyping ignores the negativity with which discriminating employers in these
sexual orientation discrimination cases impose stereotypes upon employees. Em-
ployers who are taking the adverse action against the employee or treating the
employee differently as a direct result of his or her sexual orientation are doing so
because they have formed a stereotype about who a man or woman should form a
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The three-judge panel in Hively 1 looked to an Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) decision for guidance158 as to the
distinction between gender nonconformity claims and sexual orienta-
tion claims under Title VII.159 Relying on Price Waterhouse’s determi-
nation that employers may not rely upon sex-based considerations in
the making of their employment decisions,160 the EEOC in Baldwin v.
Foxx ruled that because “[d]iscrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation is premised on sex-based preferences, assumptions, expecta-
tions, stereotypes, or norms,” sexual orientation is therefore protected
as a claim of discrimination based on gender nonconformity under Ti-
tle VII.161
As the court in Hively 1 pointed out, the EEOC had three reasons
for this conclusion, two of which are relevant to a gender nonconform-
ity claim:
(1) “sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination because
it necessarily entails treating an employee less favorably because of
the employee’s sex.”162
(3) sexual orientation discrimination is based on failure to conform
to gender stereotypes about “appropriate masculine and feminine be-
haviors, mannerisms, and appearances.”163
The Seventh Circuit in Hively 2 went further than the panel in
Hively 1 with regard to the distinction between claims of discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation and claims based on gender noncon-
formity. While Hively 1 pointed out that courts trying to distinguish
the two types of claims create inconsistent precedents because they
are attempting to create a distinction where the claims are essentially
the same,164 the Seventh Circuit in Hively 2 held that the distinction
is nonexistent.165 It explained that Hively’s claim is precisely the
relationship with, noticed an employee who did not conform to that stereotype
because of their innate sexual orientation, and taken adverse action because of
their perception of what is “right”—effectively implying that the employee’s ac-
tions and behaviors are morally “wrong.” For that reason, such generalizations
and impositions are inherently “unfair.”
158. The court acknowledged that “although the rulings of the EEOC are not binding
on this court, they are entitled to some level of deference.” Hively 1, 830 F.3d at
703 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971)).
159. Id. at 702 (noting that the EEOC’s conclusion that an allegation of discrimination
based on sexual orientation amounts to an allegation of sex discrimination).
160. Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *4 (E.E.O.C. July 15,
2015) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239, 241–42 (1989)).
161. Id. at *5.
162. Hively 1, 830 F.3d at 703 (citing Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5–7) (internal
quotations omitted).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 705 (stating that courts create inconsistent results by “turn[ing] circles
around themselves because, in fact, it is exceptionally difficult to distinguish be-
tween” the two claims).
165. Hively 2, 853 F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir. 2017).
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same as claims brought by women who were not considered for em-
ployment in traditionally male roles, such as fire departments, con-
struction, and policing.166 In those cases, the employers who were
found to have violated Title VII were effectively defining what they
believed were proper jobs and behaviors of women or men who applied
for those jobs.167
Hively, like the claimant in the Baldwin v. Foxx EEOC case,
claimed she was discriminated against because of her sexual orienta-
tion.168 Because she was a woman who had relationships with other
women, she failed to conform to gender stereotypes for appropriate
feminine behaviors, specifically by failing to be a heterosexual female
with a male partner. This discrimination is more broadly based on her
sex because of her failure to conform to the acceptable actions of a
“normal” female. According to this claim, if she conformed to the ac-
tions of a stereotypical woman and had relationships with men in-
stead of women, her employer would not have discriminated against
her and she would have been considered for the job.169 This is a valid
claim of discrimination based on sex under Title VII and other circuits
should follow the Seventh Circuit in determining so.
D. Associational Claim
The Seventh Circuit correctly held that the prohibition of discrimi-
nation based on sex under Title VII includes discrimination against a
person based on with whom he or she associates. Hively claimed her
employer discriminated against her because of her sexual orienta-
tion.170 In addition to the concept that she was not conforming to the
stereotype of how a “normal” woman should act, dress, and live her
life,171 she was also failing to associate with the type of person she
“should be” associating with according to societal norms—a man. Her
failure to associate with a man, since she was homosexual and not
heterosexual, was why her employer did not consider her for a posi-
tion, which thus constituted discrimination based on sex.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 341.
169. Since her case was dismissed on the employer’s motion to dismiss, this is the
threshold determination in viewing the facts most favorably to Hively, the plain-
tiff. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., No. 3:14–cv–1791, 2015 WL 926015, at *2
(N.D. Ind. Mar. 3, 2015) (“In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must draw all reasonable in-
ferences that favor the plaintiff, construe the allegations of the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept as true all well-pleaded facts and
allegations in the complaint.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
170. Hively 2, 853 F.3d at 341.
171. See discussion supra, section III.C.
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As the Seventh Circuit points out, an associational claim found its
roots in the landmark Supreme Court decision Loving v. Virginia,
where the Court held that “restricting the freedom to marry solely be-
cause of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause.”172 Where the Seventh Circuit falls short in
using Loving to support Hively’s associational argument is that it fails
to acknowledge that Loving was a constitutional claim based on race,
inapplicable to Hively’s statutory Title VII claim.173 The Court’s con-
stitutional analysis of a racist miscegenation state law is significantly
different from a court’s analysis of a statutory Title VII claim.
However, Hively’s associational discrimination argument does not
fail because of the Seventh Circuit’s misapplication of Loving to her
Title VII claim. Courts have permitted an associational argument
under Title VII. Specifically, discrimination based on racial associa-
tion has been prohibited under Title VII.174 In Parr v. Woodmen of the
World Life Insurance Company, a white employee was denied employ-
ment because he was married to an African American woman.175 Af-
ter his claim was initially dismissed for failure to claim discrimination
based on race, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that “[w]here a
plaintiff claims discrimination based upon an interracial marriage or
association, he alleges, by definition, that he has been discriminated
against because of his race.”176 Similarly, in Holcomb v. Iona College,
a white employee was fired because he was married to an African
American woman.177 The Second Circuit held “that an employer may
violate Title VII if it takes action against an employee because of the
172. Hively 2, 853 F.3d at 347 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
173. See id. at 356 (Posner, J., concurring) (stating that Loving is a “decision we
should avoid in ascribing present meaning to Title VII”); id. at 367–68 (Sykes,
C.J., dissenting) (stating that Loving cannot be used to validate Title VII as a
protection for sexual orientation because miscegenation laws “are inherently ra-
cially discriminatory” and sexual orientation discrimination “is not inherently
sexist”).
174. See, e.g., Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008); Tetro v. Elliott
Popham Pontiac, 173 F.3d 988, 993–95 (6th Cir. 1999) (reversing the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee’s grant of summary
judgment for the defendant employer and holding that Title VII does provide a
remedy for “individuals who are the victims of discriminatory animus towards
third persons with whom the individuals associate”); Deffenbaugh-Williams v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 589 (5th Cir. 1998), vacated in part on other
grounds by Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 182 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999); Parr
v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888 (11th Cir. 1986); Chacon v.
Ochs, 780 F. Supp. 680 (C.D. Cal. 1991); Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Sev-
enth-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
175. Parr, 791 F.2d at 889.
176. Id. at 892; see also Hively 2, 853 F.3d at 347–48 (citing Parr, 791 F.2d at 892)
(making the case that discrimination based on sexual orientation is sex discrimi-
nation under the associational theory by comparing application of the associa-
tional theory to cases of racial discrimination).
177. Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 131–32.
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employee’s association with a person of another race”178 and that
“where an employee is subjected to adverse action because an em-
ployer disapproves of interracial association, the employee suffers dis-
crimination because of the employee’s own race.”179
Circuit Judge Sykes argued in her dissent, however, that while
Loving’s “equal-protection holding extends to Title VII racial-discrimi-
nation claims because those claims share the same contextual founda-
tion,” the same type of application cannot be done for Title VII claims
of discrimination based on sex.180 Despite Judge Sykes’s argument,
courts have made it clear that Title VII claims of discrimination based
on race and sex are to be treated the same, and thus, the associational
argument may be used in the sex discrimination context.181 Title VII
does not itself create any distinctions between its enumerated catego-
ries.182 Because the enumerated categories are treated equally, claims
used to prohibit discrimination based on race should be equally ap-
plied to similar claims of discrimination based on sex, color, national
origin, and religion.
Accordingly, if one applies the associational argument from Parr
and Holcomb to Hively’s case, the outcome should read, respectively:
“Where a plaintiff claims discrimination based upon [a homosexual]
marriage or association, [s]he alleges, by definition, that [s]he has
178. Id. at 132; Hively 2, 853 F.3d at 348.
179. Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 139; Hively 2, 853 F.3d at 348.
180. Hively 2, 853 F.3d at 368–69 (Sykes, C.J., dissenting).
181. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 n.9 (1989) (“[O]ur specific
references to gender throughout this opinion, and the principles we announce,
apply with equal force to discrimination based on race, religion, or national ori-
gin.”); Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 69 n.6 (2d Cir.
2000) (“[T]he same standards apply to both race-based and sex-based hostile en-
vironment claims.”); Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 929 (9th Cir.
1982) (“[T]he standard for proving sex discrimination and race discrimination is
the same.”); Horace v. City of Pontiac, 624 F.2d 765, 768 (6th Cir. 1980) (“Both
cases concern Title VII cases of race discrimination, but the same standards and
order of proof are generally applicable to cases of sex discrimination.”); see also
Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *7 (E.E.O.C. July 15,
2015) (“This analysis is not limited to the context of race discrimination. Title VII
‘on its face treats each of the enumerated categories’ – race, color, religion, sex,
and national origin – ‘exactly the same.’” (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at
243 n.9)). But see Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986)
(arguing that Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination based on sex is not the
main concern of Title VII because, since it was passed in 1964, the Civil Rights
Act was primarily intended to combat racial issues in the United States and fur-
thermore, since the enumerated category of sex was “added to Title VII at the last
minute on the floor of the House of Representatives,” it is asserted that the racial
associational argument under Title VII cannot be transferred and applied to a sex
associational argument under Title VII (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2577–2584
(1964))).
182. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012); Baldwin, 2015 WL
4397641, at *7.
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been discriminated against because of [her] [sex,]”183 and “where an
employee is subjected to adverse action because an employer disap-
proves of [homosexual] association, the employee suffers discrimina-
tion because of the employee’s own [sex].”184 By simply using the Parr
and Holcomb holdings and appropriately substituting “homosexual”
for “interracial” and “sex” for “race,” courts hearing a sex association
argument under Title VII will come to the same conclusion—discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation as seen through one’s association
with a person of the same sex is prohibited under Title VII.
E. Policy Implications
Permitting discrimination based on sexual orientation in the work-
place “create[s] a paradoxical legal landscape in which a person can be
married on Saturday and then fired on Monday for just that act;”185
because, although Obergefell v. Hodges now guarantees anyone the
right to marry another person of the same gender, Title VII, in almost
all circuits except the Seventh Circuit and Second Circuit, also allows
employers to fire that employee for exercising that right.186 This could
render the very right granted in Obergefell moot because if exercised,
the person must face the risk that he or she could be fired or not hired
precisely for that reason.
While some states have anti-discrimination statutes that explicitly
include sexual orientation, over half of U.S. states do not, including
Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indi-
ana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Mis-
souri,187 Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
183. Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986);
Hively 2, 853 F.3d at 347–48.
184. Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 139; Hively 2, 853 F.3d at 348.
185. Hively 1, 830 F.3d 698, 714 (7th Cir. 2016).
186. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
187. Although Missouri does not have a statute explicitly prohibiting employment dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation, it does have a statute mirroring Title
VII. MO. REV. STAT. § 213.055.1(1)(a) (1986) (“It shall be an unlawful employment
practice . . . [f]or an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual . . .
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry,
age or disability . . . .”). Relying on this statute, the Missouri Court of Appeals
recently reversed a grant of summary judgment to an employer, ruling that sex-
ual orientation is included in the statute’s prohibition of discrimination based on
sex, citing to Price Waterhouse and its prohibition of sex stereotyping, just as in
Hively 2. Lampley v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, No. WD80288, 2017 WL
4779447, at *3 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2017) (“If an employer mistreats a male
employee because the employer deems the employee insufficiently masculine, it is
immaterial whether the male employee is gay or straight. The prohibition against
sex discrimination extends to all employees, regardless of gender identity or sex-
ual orientation.”).
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Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.188 Accordingly, most
Americans are not protected from discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation. This lack of protection goes directly against the purpose of
Title VII—to create equality in the workplace, where there were sig-
nificant disparities before, by prohibiting discrimination based on
sex.189
The protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation
is especially important in light of the innate nature of one’s sexual
identity and preferences190 and the horrific history of treatment of
people who identify as homosexual. This point is highlighted in The
American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) amicus brief filed in
Obergefell v. Hodges.191 The brief notes that at the time the first Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) was pub-
lished in 1952, homosexuality was considered a mental disorder.192
This categorization was not changed in the DSM until 1973,193 well
after the passage of the Civil Rights Act.
In the modern era, statutes like the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA) and associated guidelines may in practice make discrimi-
nation against homosexual employees easier by rationalizing it
through religious beliefs.194 Specifically, a recently released memo-
randum from the Office of the Attorney General states that
“[r]eligious corporations, associations, educational institutions, and
societies . . . have an express statutory exemption from Title VII’s pro-
hibition on religious discrimination in employment,” which in practice
means that “religious organizations may choose to employ only per-
sons whose beliefs and conduct are consistent with the organizations’
religious precepts.”195 Thus, an employer could use RFRA or the Re-
ligion Clauses of the Constitution to discriminate against a homosex-
ual employee on the basis of contrary religious beliefs, thus
circumventing Title VII’s prohibition of sexual orientation discrimina-
188. Hively 1, 830 F.3d at 714.
189. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
190. Brief of the American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioners at 8–9, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556,
14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1004713 (“Most gay men and lesbians do not
experience their sexual orientation as a voluntary choice”).
191. Id. at 1.
192. Id. at 7.
193. Id. at 8.
194. See Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, supra note 5.
195. Id. at 6. But see The Equality Act, H.R. 2282, 115th Cong. § 9 (2017) (the pro-
posed Equality Act, discussed supra note 128, states that RFRA “shall not pro-
vide a claim concerning, or a defense to a claim under, a covered title, or provide a
basis for challenging the application or enforcement of a covered title,” meaning
that an employer would not be able to invoke RFRA as a rationale for the em-
ployer’s discrimination of an employee).
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tion as a subset of sex.196 Permitting discrimination because of relig-
ious rationales is a particularly egregious violation of Title VII given
that each enumerated category in Title VII is to be placed on equal
footing and to be of equal importance.197 This allowance is contrary to
the purpose of Title VII of protecting employees and creating equality
in the workplace by prohibiting discrimination based on sex, including
all of the interpretive expansions, and it increases the need for protec-
tion of LGBT employees in the workplace.
In addition to social stigma that continues today, the history of
maltreatment of homosexual populations renders protection of that
population especially important—somewhat similar to the clear and
urgent need to legislatively protect African Americans in 1964, which
led to the passing of the Civil Rights Act. Limiting these protections to
the context of marriage would lead to the paradoxical landscape as
described by the court in Hively 2. These protections should also be
applied to the employment context under Title VII, as the Seventh
Circuit did in Hively 2.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit correctly held that Title VII prohibits discrim-
ination based on sexual orientation. Protecting employees from dis-
crimination based on their sexual orientation fits squarely within
Title VII’s broad purpose of protecting employees from discriminatory
behaviors of employers who are inherently in a position of power over
their employees. Circuit courts have incorrectly prohibited such a
claim based merely on the precedent of an untenable distinction be-
tween claims of sexual orientation discrimination and gender noncon-
formity discrimination. In addition to drawing a line where one does
not exist in reality, claims of sexual orientation discrimination are via-
ble associational discrimination claims under Title VII.
Accordingly, other circuits should follow the Seventh Circuit’s ex-
ample in rehearing issues similar to Hively’s en banc in order to over-
turn precedent that is not in line with the overall purpose of Title
VII—promoting equality in the workplace, where there were signifi-
cant disparities before, by prohibiting discrimination based on sex. Al-
ternatively, if precedent continues to be followed in the other circuits
and this difference in the application of Title VII between circuits per-
sists, the Supreme Court should hear this issue and resolve it in favor
of those who are discriminated against in the workplace because of
their sexual orientation. An individual should be able to get married
196. See Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, supra note 5.
197. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 n.9 (1989) (“[O]ur specific refer-
ences to gender throughout this opinion, and the principles we announce, apply
with equal force to discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin.”).
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on Saturday and not have to worry about being fired on Monday for
the exercise of that constitutional right.
